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A New Age of Federalism?
Thomas W. Merrill

F

ederalism has been in the news a lot
over the past few years. The Republican-controlled Congress has enacted
restrictions on the imposition of unfunded
federal mandates on state governments and
has passed signiÕcant welfare reform, one of
the keys to which is greater state freedom in
the implementation of welfare programs. The
President, although often seen as resisting the
more extreme Republican proposals for devolution, is himself something of an advocate for
states’ rights. Clinton was a governor before he
was President, and in that capacity he experienced a number of frustrations with federal
red tape. Perhaps as a result, the Clinton Administration has been generous in granting
waivers to States under federal entitlement
programs – far more so than were the Reagan
and Bush Administrations.1
Perhaps the biggest news on the federalism

front in recent years, however, has come from
the Supreme Court. The Court has rendered a
series of dramatic decisions shifting power
from the federal government to the States. In
United States v. Lopez,2 the Court held that
Congress has no power under the Constitution to make it a federal crime to possess a gun
within 1000 feet of a school yard. The federal
government defended the statute as a permissible exercise of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce, but the Court said it
could not see how the mere possession of a
gun near a school yard, not itself a form a commercial activity, would have a substantial aÖect
on the movement of goods and services in interstate commerce. So for the Õrst time since
1937, the Supreme Court struck down a federal
law as being beyond the powers of the federal
government to regulate interstate commerce.
The next year, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,3

Thomas W. Merrill is the John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law. This
essay is based on the Charles Robison Lecture delivered at Knox College, May 23, 1996.
1 President Reagan of course was also a governor. But for whatever reason federalism initiatives during
his Administration tended to be more symbolic than those coming out of Washington recently.
2 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
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the Court held that Congress has no power to
pass laws subjecting the States to suits in federal court brought by private parties. The
Court said such a law would oÖend the “sovereign immunity” of the States, recognized in
the Eleventh Amendment, and that Congress
has no power to override this immunity – at
least when it is exercising one of its powers
enumerated in Article I of the Constitution.
Most recently, the Court curtailed Congress’s
power to legislate under the authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 and it
ruled that Congress may not directly compel
state oÓcers to administer federal programs.5
The practical impact of these decisions is
debatable. Congress may be able to get around
the new restrictions on its commerce power
and its Section 5 power by using its spending
power. And Congress should be able to get
around Seminole Tribe and subject the States to
suits so long as the federal government, rather
than private parties, does the suing. Nevertheless, these decisions are extremely important
as symbolic statements. Together with all the
movement on the legislative and administrative fronts, they tend to support the notion
that the federal government has gotten too big
relative to the state and local governments, and
has usurped functions that rightly should be
located at governmental levels closer to the
people.
When we look around the world the news
on federalism appears more mixed. Within
the last twenty-Õve years, constitutional revision has led to major devolutions of power –
and therefore greater vertical divisions – in
Belgium, Spain, Canada, and now even Great
Britain. And the last twenty-Õve years have
witnessed one very dramatic example of the

creation of a new federal system through integration – the emergence of the European
Union. Although the German Supreme Court
recently insisted that the Single European Act
and the Maastricht Treaty do not make the
European Union a true federal system,6 the
political reality is that the community government has evolved to a point where nearly all
impartial observers agree it is at least headed
in that direction.7 The community not only
rules on issues of trade among the member
states and with states outside the union, it also
has a great deal to say about policy in areas like
agriculture, the environment, labor, and product safety and design. Clearly, the community
government has greater powers than did the
Congress of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, although it still has
some distance to go before it enjoys the powers that the federal government in the United
States does today.
On the other hand, by no means all the
news in the past twenty-Õve years has been
encouraging for the future of the federalism
idea. Our neighbor to the north has narrowly
averted two attempted break-ups of its federal
system by the separatists in Quebec. A number of former communist states that were
nominally federal in nature split apart after the
communists fell from power in 1989. Czechoslovakia split into two nation states peacefully,
but in Yugoslavia the break-up led to a brutal
civil war within the Bosnian territories. And
although the dissolution of the Soviet Union –
another nominal federal system – was peaceful, the Russian federation that succeeded to
the lion’s share of the Soviet Union is itself
strained by violent upheavals in the perimeter
of its own federal system.

4 City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
5 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
6 Federal Constitutional Court decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty, October 13, 1993, reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 388, 423-26 (1994).
7 See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 78 Am. J. Comp. L. 205
(1990).
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Perhaps the former communist states are
not true barometers of the future of federalism, since in reality these states were held together by the monopoly of power enjoyed by
the communist party. True federal systems, by
their very nature, rest on a kind of delicate
equilibrium of consensus. Whether created by
devolution or integration, they are based on a
consensus among diÖerent contiguous peoples
that they want a common government for
some purposes, and separate governments for
other purposes. What happens when unions
that are held together not by consensus but by
force break apart does not tell us much about
the future of genuine federal systems.
The question I will address here is whether
we are in fact entering into a new age of federalism. That is, are we entering an age where
the idea of nationalism – of the single, all powerful unitary state – is in eclipse, and the idea
of federalism – of power divided vertically
among diÖerent layers of government – will be
in ascendancy? As an American, I am of
course particularly interested in the future of
the federal idea in the United States. Most of
our history – from the centralizing decisions
of the Marshall Court, to the Civil War and
the post-Civil War constitutional amendments, to the progressive era with its Interstate Commerce Commission and federal
antitrust laws, to the New Deal, to the Great
Society – reÔects a long march of gradually expanding central governmental power and a
seemingly inexorable retreat of state autonomy. Does all of the recent din coming out of
Washington about devolution and states’
rights represent a genuine turning point – a
reversal of this process? Or is it just a blip on
the time chart, a small “correction” in the Dow
Jones Index of Central Governmental Power
that will soon be eclipsed as that index re-

sumes its upward trend? Considering recent
developments, it seems to me that Americans
(and others) may well be entering a new age of
federalism. But the new federalism that is
likely to emerge will exist on an entirely diÖerent plane from that suggested by the publicity
generated by Congress’s, the President’s, and
the Supreme Court’s recent initiatives.

N
Perhaps the Õrst part of this inquiry is to ask
what we mean by a federal system of government. How does a federal system diÖer from a
unitary system of government, like that of, say,
France? And how does a federal system diÖer
from a league or an alliance, such as the North
American Treaty Organization or the Organization of American States? Wilfred McClay
has remarked that “It would … be hard to
imagine a political concept more poorly understood than federalism.”8 Indeed, he adds,
most Americans “no longer have the slightest
idea what federalism is.” However, most
scholars of federalism – and as McClay also
noted, this is not a very large group – would
agree on the following minimal deÕnition: A
federal system is one in which political power
is divided vertically between central and
regional authorities, and the leaders at each
level do not depend on the other level for their
political authority.9 In addition, it is probably
also an essential feature of federalism that
both levels of government enjoy some nonnegligible governmental powers. If the leaders
of either the central or the regional units are
separately elected, but their only governmental function is to choose the Ôag or the oÓcial
Ôower of that unit, this would not qualify as a
genuine federal system.
Others would go further, and insist that in a

8 Wilfred M. McClay, A More Perfect Union? Toward a New Federalism, 100 Commentary 28 (Sept.
1995).
9 See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1488 n. 5 (1994).
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federal system there must also be some agreed
boundary between the powers of the central
government and the powers of the regional
governments, some consensus about their respective “spheres” of power. I concede that this
feature appears in most federal systems. But
whether it is a necessary condition or not I
cannot say. Many constitutional law scholars
in the United States have argued that our federal system could continue to function for
quite some time without any bright line understanding of the boundaries between the powers of the federal government and the States,
and they may be right. Indeed, some would
even go so far as to say that it is a deÕning feature of the U.S. system that the lines are anything but clear. So for purposes of my inquiry
here, I will stick to the minimal deÕnition.
One interesting implication of this deÕnition is that a federal system does not diÖer
from a unitary system like that of France
because unitary systems are “centralized” and
federal systems are “decentralized.” All systems of government – at least in complex societies – contain elements of centralization and
decentralization. France has departments and
municipal authorities as well as its central government. But France is not a federal system,
because the leaders in these regional units are
dependent on the central government for their
political authority. The central government
could expand or contract their powers at will,
and could abolish their oÓces in a governmental reorganization overnight.
Because one can have decentralization
without federalism, some commentators have
insisted that the American preoccupation
with federalism is simply a “national neurosis.”10 Most of the advantages commonly cited
for federalism – bringing government closer to

the people, permitting experimentation with
diÖerent types of government programs, and
so forth – could be realized in a unitary system
with an appropriate degree of decentralization
among its administrative units. In order to
identify the functions of a federal system,
therefore, one must take care to identify functions that are served by a system of government in which both the central authority and
the regional authorities have independent
bases of sovereign power, and not simply functions that could be achieved by administrative
decentralization.
What are the functions of a federal system,
properly deÕned? Why do federal systems –
that is, systems with two separate sovereignties – exist? If there is a trend of sorts toward
federal systems around the world in the past
twenty-Õve years, what is it about federal systems that makes them attractive in many circumstances, relative to unitary nation-states?
There are a number of healthy, functioning
federal systems around the world. In addition
to those previously mentioned, I would include within this group Australia, Germany,
India, and Switzerland. We can examine the
constitutions of these federal systems, to see
what sorts of functions they allocate to the
central government and what they leave to the
regional units. When we do so, we discover a
rather remarkable degree of commonality in
the allocation of certain powers.11
Questions about internal commerce among
the regional units – the movement of goods,
people and capital between those units – are
without fail given to the central government.
At a minimum, it seems, one reason to create a
federal system is to adopt a “free trade zone”
among contiguous regions. This of course was
a major motivation for the adoption of the

10 Edwin L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 903 (1994).
11 A valuable study that undertakes this kind of survey, although unfortunately quite dated, is William
H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (1964).
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American constitution. It is also the primary
rationale for the creation of the European
Union, and comes through loud and clear in
the constitutions of Germany, Switzerland,
Canada, Australia, India, Spain and Belgium.
A second function almost always given to
the central government is control over external
relations – defense and foreign policy. This is
characteristic of the United States, Canada,
Switzerland, Germany, Australia, India, Belgium and Spain. The European Union –
which is a kind of emerging federal system –
represents a partial exception to this generalization. Even here, however, control over foreign trade policy is given collectively to the
Union, and an overlapping multinational organization – nato, which is expanding to include
more of Europe – has long held responsibility
for external defense. Moreover, it is clear that
one of the central motivations for creating the
European Union was to bring about a kind of
commercial and political union among the
most powerful nations in Europe, so that another European war of the sort that plagued
the Õrst half of this century would be unthinkable.
A third function commonly given to the
central government is what we might crudely
call the regulation of large business Õrms.
Antitrust laws, laws regulating the issuance of
securities, intellectual property laws, labor
laws, social security laws, and product safety
laws all tend to be located in the central
authority. And Õnally, control over the money
system is centrally located. Nearly all federal
systems have a single currency and a single
central bank; even the European Union is
committed to developing a common European
currency under the Maastricht Treaty.
What about the other side of the ledger?

Are there functions that are almost uniformly
given to the regional units of government?
Interestingly, the answer is yes. All of the surveyed federal systems allocate basic control
over public education up through the equivalent of what we call high school to the regional
units of government. This is diÖerent from
unitary governmental systems, like Britain and
France, where public education is typically
controlled at the central governmental level.
Apparently there is something about the rationale for creating a federal system that points
strongly to allocating control over basic public
education to the regional units.12
Other issues that tend to be given to the
regional units can be described as cultural in
nature. Family law – questions of marriage,
divorce, child custody and the like – is generally given to the regional units. Similarly, if
there is a state religion or if governmental support for particular religions is permitted, this
function also is given to the regional units.
Likewise, the same is true for governmental
control over designation of an oÓcial language, a function that appears to be especially
important in multi-lingual federal systems like
Switzerland, Belgium and Canada, and to a
degree in Spain, where regional dialects are
important.
A common pattern of sorts emerges. Control over external relations, over commerce
among regional units and the outside world,
and over business regulation and economic
policy is almost always given to the central
government; control over education, family
law, and cultural issues is almost always given
to the regional units. In between, it is diÓcult
to detect any clear patterns. For example, the
law of contracts and personal injury law are
sometimes given to the central government,

12 This is conÕrmed by the recent referenda in Scotland and Wales, approving greater autonomy for
these regions. Education is prominent among the powers to be given to the new regional governments, while the central government will continue to be responsible for the national economy, employment, and defense.
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sometimes to the regional governments.
What might account for this pattern? I
would suggest the following: Federal systems
are adopted when two driving forces among
contiguous groups of people are in rough equilibrium. One force is the desire to achieve certain economies of scale through the merger of
separate governmental systems into a single
larger system. The other force is the desire, on
the part of at least some of these groups, to assure that their separate cultural identities will
not be submerged into a new synthetic identity dictated by a majority of the larger system.
Federalism therefore requires some sense of
commonality among contiguous peoples – but
not too much commonality. Obviously, there
must be a certain minimal sense of commonality, or these contiguous groups will be too
mistrustful to enter into any kind of joint governmental enterprise. On the other hand,
there cannot be too much commonality, or the
contiguous groups will simply form a unitary
state. Federalism thus comes about when the
sense of commonality is suÓciently strong to
allow partial integration to achieve economies
of scale, but where the sense of commonality
is suÓciently tenuous that locally dominant
groups are not willing to put their separate
cultural identity at risk by submitting to rule
by the majority of the whole.
Switzerland, which has been a stable federal
system for almost as long as the United States,
provides a textbook illustration of the equilibrium between these two driving forces. The
Swiss cantons were traditionally Õercely independent, and they remain today culturally very
diverse. Some are German speaking, some are
French speaking, and a few speak Italian.
Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some
are mostly rural, others entirely urban. After

the independent cantons were conquered by
Napoleon, they decided it would be to their
mutual advantage to enter into a confederation
for the purpose of a common defense. This
was followed in 1848 by the realization that
eliminating trade barriers among the cantons
would be to everyone’s advantage – both the
predominantly agricultural cantons and those
with signiÕcant manufacturing and commercial activities. In 1874 these decisions were incorporated into a new federal constitution,
which survives to this day. While the Swiss
constitution has been amended over 100
times – often to give new, carefully-deÕned,
functions to the central government reÔecting
a more and more economically interdependent
society – control over education, language, and
religious issues has remained at the canton
level, providing assurance to each canton that
it can maintain its unique cultural identity.
Other multi-lingual federal systems, including Canada, Belgium, Spain, and of
course the European Union, also Õt this model
fairly well. Germany Õts the model too, insofar
as Bavaria and the south are predominately
Catholic and the northern states are historically predominantly Protestant. In each case
there is suÓcient commonality among the
states to permit integration in the performance of relatively impersonal governmental
functions, leading to potential economies of
scale. But in each, there is not enough commonality to permit complete integration into a
unitary state.13

N
What about the United States? Can the persistence of federalism in this country be explained by the two driving forces I have

13 The recent history of Canada also suggests that the sense of commonality does not necessarily grow
over time, resulting in closer and closer integration. If one geographically based group, like the Francophone Quebecois, feels suÓciently estranged from the larger society, then the very existence of a
federal system may come to be threatened by secession.
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described? I think the answer is yes, although
the critical aspect of separate cultural identity
is not one that is especially pleasant to contemplate. When the thirteen colonies separated from Great Britain, they shared much in
common culturally speaking. All were predominantly English speaking, all had voting
majorities who were descendants of immigrants from Britain, and all had legal and political systems based on English traditions. To
be sure there were religious diÖerences –
Catholics in Maryland, Quakers in Pennsylvania, and so forth. But with high rates of
immigration and population turnover, these
diÖerences were rapidly breaking down, as
suggested by the fact that by the early 19th
century no state had an oÓcial religion.
One would expect, based on these facts
alone, a very high degree of commonality. And
indeed, upon independence the thirteen
former colonies very quickly entered into a
military alliance to prosecute the Revolutionary War. After the war’s successful conclusion,
however, Congress had trouble establishing an
eÖective foreign policy, trade frictions broke
out among some of the States, and liberal insolvency rules in some states threatened to dry
up new investment. The Constitution was
proposed and adopted in an eÖort to achieve a
more eÖective central government that would
overcome these problems.
The question is why, given the common
heritage and language, didn’t the original
States go further and establish a unitary nation state? One very important reason, I would
submit, was the cultural division created by
slavery. Slavery was essentially a regional phenomenon. This “peculiar institution,” as it has
been called, kept hundreds of thousands of
Americans of African descent in bondage in
the southern states, and formed a vital prop to
the southern plantation economy. It also
became, over time, an important element in
establishing a distinctive southern cultural
identity. Although not unknown in the north-

ern states, slavery was opposed by many in the
north on moral grounds, and was thoroughly
dispensable there as an economic institution.
It played virtually no role in the northern cultural identity, except insofar as opposition to
slavery became part of that identity.
Although the Constitution is rather circumspect about this, it seems very likely that
slavery and the uniqueness of the southern
culture that depended on slavery is a key reason why the furthest the thirteen regional
States would go was the adoption of a federal
system of government. The south as much as
the north was attracted by the economies of
scale that could be achieved by political
integration: a common defense against Great
Britain and other potential enemies, a common and coordinated foreign policy apparatus, free access to ports and free trade in goods
among the thirteen states. But the southern
States would never agree to complete political
union because that would mean that the fate
of slavery would be decided by future national
political majorities.
The original Constitution was thus designed to give the central government limited
and circumscribed powers, and certainly nothing that would permit it to legislate on the
subject of slavery. Indeed, Congress was
speciÕcally prohibited from legislating on the
subject of the importation of slaves for twenty
years, a fugitive slave clause was included, and
Congress was required to pay just compensation for any seizures of “property,” including,
presumably, property in slaves. The Constitution, in short, was designed to protect slavery
in the south from interference by any future
majority hostile to its continued existence.
Slavery and the fate of black Americans was
also the issue that dominated interpretations
of American federalism for the following 150
years. This was the issue that led, of course, to
the Civil War. The victory of the north in that
war, in turn, produced far reaching constitutional amendments that expanded the power
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of the central government at the expense of
the States – all in the interest of ending slavery
and protecting the newly liberated African
Americans. But the subsequent enforcement,
or rather lack of enforcement, of those amendments allowed the south to maintain a system
of racial segregation and subordination for almost another 100 years. The key issue during
this struggle was, not surprisingly, schools – in
this case the right of the southern states to
maintain schools segregated by race. Because
education in the United States was, as in other
federal systems, conÕned to the state and local
governments, the south was able to maintain
its system of segregated schools, and hence racial subordination of African Americans, essentially until the early 1970s. Southern
distinctiveness in this regard ended only when
the federal government Õnally intruded and
shifted control over this one aspect of educational policy from the states to the federal government.
It is often said that the cause of federalism
and states’ rights in the United States has been
given a bum rap because of its historical association with slavery and the race issue. If the
foregoing analysis is right, however, this connection is no fortuitous accident. Absent slavery and the race issue, it is not clear that the
United States would have been founded as a
federal system in the Õrst place. Or at the very
least, it is not clear that it would have remained a federal system for as long as it has.
As the United States experience suggests,
there is an ugly side to federalism. Preserving
the cultural identity of groups that represent a
geographically concentrated majority can
mean suppressing the cultural aspirations of
minorities within that geographic area.
ConÕrmation of this proposition can be supplied by examining the recent experience regarding separatists’ eÖorts to have Quebec
secede from the Canadian federation. The
groups most adamantly opposed to secession
are the Inuit and Cree Indian tribes of Que-

160

bec. These tribes perceive that an independent
Quebec would spell greater oppression for
them, as a numeric minority within the geographic boundaries of Quebec. Likewise,
Quebec’s 10 percent immigrant population
overwhelmingly opposes secession, including
even French-speaking Haitian and Lebanese
immigrants. In short, many of those within
Quebec opposing independence fear that an
independent Quebec would be less tolerant of
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities within
Quebec than is the case while Quebec remains
part of a larger Canadian federation, with
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms
protecting the linguistic and educational
rights of minorities throughout Quebec and
Canada as a whole.
Thus, the example of the southern States in
the U.S. reÔects only a more extreme version
of a general phenomenon. Federalism is good
for minorities that are majorities within
deÕned geographic areas, but it is bad for subminorities within these areas. For minorities
too small or too dispersed to make up a majority in any state, a strong central government
appears to be preferable to federalism.

N
What does the simple model of two dynamic
forces suggest about the future of federalism in
the United States more generally? First of all, I
do not mean to imply by the foregoing analysis
that the recent interest in federalism in the
U.S. is a mere cover for racism. Perhaps in the
minds of some this is the case. But I don’t
think it is the primary motivating factor for
the Republican leadership, President Clinton,
or the Supreme Court. Rather, I think the
resurgence of interest in federalism is symptomatic of a more general frustration with
government, and in particular with the size
and ineÓciencies of the federal government. If
the resurgence of interest in federalism is a
cover for anything, it is a cover for an interest
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in decentralization of government. But as I explained earlier, decentralization can take
place with or without federalism. So the call
for stricter enforcement of federalism can
probably best be explained on grounds of expediency: federalism has a basis in the Constitution, and stricter enforcement of federalism
limits in the Constitution is thought to be the
most plausible way to achieve greater decentralization of government.
Looking at longer term trends, however, the
dual driving force model of federalism suggests
that the current calls for a return to a stricter
enforcement of federalism limitations is probably just a brief pause on the path of increasing
centralization and nationalism, rather than the
beginnings of a new era of weaker central government and stronger states. The basic reason
for this is that America is becoming less and
less a country with distinctive minorities that
are geographically based majorities. To be sure,
America is becoming more and more a nation
of minorities – racial, ethnic, religious, sexual
preference, life style, you-name-it minorities.
But the critical point is that these minorities
are less and less likely to be geographically
concentrated. As historian Daniel Boorstin
observed many years ago, America has always
been a nation of communities – but increasingly this means a nation of communities
based on shared interests and identities, not
communities based on geography.14
I do not deny that there remain detectable
diÖerences among the regions of the United
States. Relative to the Midwest, the Northeast
is more secular, more Catholic, more ethnic,
and more likely to favor redistributive government programs. The South is more religious,
more culturally conservative, less Catholic,
and more racially polarized in its voting. The
West, especially in the Rocky Mountain re-

gions, is more libertarian, more hostile to federal landholding and environmental policies.15
But these are nuances, subject to many exceptions, and subject to continual change as
people move about and sort themselves into
communities or regions based on their individual preferences. None of these diÖerences
approaches the historically rooted and relatively unchanging diÖerences among the Swiss
cantons that sustain Swiss federalism, or the
sharp regional diÖerences over slavery and race
that sustained American federalism for so
many decades.
Close observance of the political actors
who quote the Tenth Amendment and sing
the praises of federalism also suggests that
their commitment to federalism is largely
opportunistic. President Clinton, on this as
well as other questions, tends to be opportunistic, and will support centralization of
traditional state functions – as with the illfated heath care reforms – as easily as he will
support state experimentation. The Republicans who clamored for an end to unfunded
mandates and returning welfare to the States
are quick to endorse new federal crimes that
bear no relationship to the original conception
of the appropriate scope of federal government power. For example, they enthusiastically supported the so-called “Megan’s Law,”
which compels governments to inform individuals when former sex oÖenders are released
into their communities, and they have called
for a federal statute prohibiting “partial live
birth” abortions. Both these laws, however,
represent a further centralization of political
authority in the U.S., not a return to greater
state power and autonomy. Even the Supreme
Court Justices most strongly attached to federalism are guilty of inconsistencies, as when
they come down hard on States that adopt ag-

14 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Decline of Radicalism (1964).
15 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 767-68 (1995).
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gressive afÕrmative action plans, or expand
federal limitations on state regulation of
private property.
In short, the conditions for a genuine federalist counterrevolution appear to be lacking in
the United States. And there is little evidence
of clear and consistent behavior on the part of
executive, legislative, or judicial elites pointing
toward a principled return of governmental
authority to the States.
This does not mean, however, that federalism and the federal idea will not play an important role in America’s future. That role is
not likely to come about, however, because of a
shift in power from the federal government to
the States. It is more likely to come about
because of a shift in power from the federal
government and the States to new transnational entities like nafta and gatt. The
General Agreement on TariÖs and Trade
(gatt) and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (nafta) are signiÕcant integrative
developments that, while they do not themselves come close to creating true federal systems, perhaps contain the germ of future
federal systems. Both gatt and nafta require
signatory nation states to commit to undertake future modiÕcations in their domestic
policies to promote free trade among signatory
states. These modiÕcations will be ordered by
transnational institutions – bodies like the
World Trade Organization established by the
Uruguay Round of gatt – not by the political
institutions of the member states.
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This upward integration meets the general
characteristics I have deÕned for federalism,
although of course in a nascent form. So far,
these integrative eÖorts are mostly economic,
designed to implement a consensus on the
beneÕts of international free trade. And, although the members of the new transnational
bodies are chosen by the governments of the
member states and do not have a strictly separate source of political authority, they increasingly partake of the features of governments,
such as decision making by majority rule and
compulsory dispute settlement by adjudication subject to appellate review.
If the rudimentary common market established in Europe by the Common Market
Treaty of 1957 can eventually grow into something approaching a true federal system of
government, it does not take too much of a visionary to see the possibility, down the road, of
transnational organizations like gatt and
nafta evolving into genuine, and perhaps
overlapping, federal systems. If this happens,
federalism will return to the American scene
because America itself – increasingly a unitary
nation state – will become a kind of regional
governmental unit in one or more larger
federations. Such a new age of federalism will
feature very diÖerent institutions from the
ones with which we are familiar. But the
underlying dynamic – produced by opposing
aspirations for economies of scale through
integration and cultural autonomy through
separation – will remain the same. B
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